Using industry data from Eurostat and applying the Rajan-Zingales methodology, we investigate the real growth effects of banking sector integration in the European Union. Our sample stretches from 2000 until 2012 and includes the phase of rapid financial integration before the crisis as well as the following phase of financial fragmentation and bank deleveraging. We find evidence that banking sector integration had a more than four times stronger growth effect during the crisis than in normal times. Growth effects are also stronger in times of domestic bank deleveraging. We conclude that concerns of European policy makers about fragmentation in the European banking sector are justified and that future reintegration is an important building block of future growth perspectives in the European Union.
1 Introduction "While financial integration deepened significantly after the Euro was introduced, the global crisis caused that process to go into reverse. And we can see the importance of financial integration for the single currency all the more in its absence. In the periphery, financial fragmentation has led to high interest rates for firms and households, and disrupted monetary policy transmission. In the core, it has led to exceptionally low interest rates for savers and potentially distorted asset prices. Consequently, the whole of the Euro area would benefit from lasting financial reintegration -and indeed, addressing financial fragmentation has been one of the key tasks of euro area policy-makers, including the ECB, over the past years."
Mario Draghi (2014)
Banking sector integration is a key objective of the European Union (EU). After a substantial deepening of financial integration before the crisis, the process started to reverse with the onset of the crisis. Under the pressure of regulators and national governments, banks started to shift their focus towards their "core markets". Consequently, the European banking sector is far more fragmented today than it had been before the crisis.
European policy makers are concerned about this development, since banking sector integration may affect European growth prospects, the transmission of the European Central Bank's (ECB) monetary policy, and financial stability (see the speech by Draghi, 2014) . This paper is the first attempt to investigate the real growth effects of the ongoing fragmentation process in European banking markets. Using data from 2000 to 2012, our dataset covers the period of integration before the financial crisis and the following period of fragmentation. We allow for heterogeneous effects by distinguishing between crisis and non-crisis times, phases of domestic bank deleveraging and other times, as well as times of disintegration and integration. Our analysis suggests that financial fragmentation generates significant growth losses and emphasizes the need for financial reintegration in Europe. In particular, we identify growth effects of banking sector integration in Europe that are more than four times bigger during times of crisis than in normal times. Similarly striking differences are found in phases of strong domestic bank deleveraging compared to other times, but not in periods of financial disintegration. This seems to reflect the importance of foreign capital as an insurance mechanism against negative shocks to domestic bank lending in times of crisis and deleveraging. We further analyze the impact of cross-border lending on industry growth differentials. Here we find rather mixed results.
This suggests that especially the presence of foreign banks via branches and subsidiaries is important to reduce the negative effects of shocks to domestic bank lending, in particular during times of severe financial constraints.
Using industry-level data from Eurostat, we apply the methodology of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and investigate production growth differentials on the industry level. We assume that industries with a high dependence on external finance are more constrained in their growth potential by financial frictions than industries with an inherently lower need for external capital. Deeper banking sector integration may reduce these frictions and hence increase the differential of industry production growth between financially dependent and non-dependent industries. The main advantage over country-level approaches is a more credible identification strategy. Since industry-specific growth can be considered exogenous to the development of banking sector integration, reverse causality is less of a concern than in country-level studies. Our study intends to identify short-run growth effects of integration, therefore our analysis relies on annual data rather than long-run averages as in the original Rajan-Zingales analysis. Banking sector integration is measured by total assets of foreign banks over GDP. Hence, we focus on the total amount of foreign bank assets rather than the composition of banking assets, in contrast to most other papers on banking sector integration, which analyze the growth effects of the share of foreign assets.
During times of crisis, subsidiaries of foreign banks tend to adjust their lending differently than domestic banks.
1 While this automatically leads to changes in the share of foreign banks in total bank assets during a crisis, it does not necessarily imply that the overall availability of capital changes in a particular direction.
Before the crisis the process of banking sector integration in Europe was seen as a key feature of the convergence process in which Eastern European transition as well as periphery countries could catch up to the core and at the same time finance current account deficits over a longer time horizon. Since the financial and sovereign debt crisis, however, this has changed completely. Since then, the European banking sector experiences a strong process of fragmentation. Banks began to reduce business in foreign countries by withdrawing capital and closing branches and subsidiaries. This disintegration process is widely documented in the literature. Giannetti and Laeven (2012) and Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011) show that during the crisis banks decreased their foreign lending more strongly than their home lending. A more differentiated picture is drawn by de Haas and van Horen (2013) . Using loan level data, they find evidence for heterogeneity of the flight home effect. Banks reduced their lending less if the market was geographically near, if they had more experience in the market, if they were present via a subsidiary and if they acted in cooperation with a domestic lender. Lannoo and Napoli, 2010).
Our paper adds to both the literature on the growth effects of financial integration and the disrupting effects of financial crises. The benefits and costs of financial integration are still debated in the literature. 4 This is supported by theoretical work, e. g., of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) and Coeurdacier, Rey, and Winant (2013) who show that if there are positive growth effects at all, they are expected to be relatively small. Similarly, evidence for growth effects of banking sector integration is rather mixed. By studying growth on the industry level, Bruno and Hauswald (2014) find an overall positive growth effect of a higher share of foreign banks. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2004) argue that 2 A stabilizing effect can also be found by formal commitment, shown by de Haas, Korniyenko, Pivovarsky, and Loukoianova (2012) . They use commitment letters of the Vienna Initiative to demonstrate that during the crisis banks committed to exposures in Central and Eastern Europe reduced lending substantially less than in countries without such a commitment.
3 See Rose and Wieladek (2014) for evidence that nationalized non-British banks decreased lending to and increased interest rates for UK firms. Somewhat surprisingly, nationalized British banks did not engage in financial protectionism.
4 For an excellent overview, see Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei (2009) . a higher share of foreign banks reduces obstacles from banking sector concentration, since smaller firms can more easily obtain external financing. Giannetti and Ongena (2012) find that foreign banks improve access to credit and thereby reduce financial constraints for firms. However, there are also papers doubting the benefits of banking sector integration. Gormley (2010) investigates foreign bank entry in India and finds that foreign banks crowded out domestic banks, worsening access to credit for most firms. Similarly, Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008) argue that welfare might be reduced by foreign bank presence, since some customers may benefit while others suffer.
However, Europe seems to be different. Guiso, Jappelli, Padula, and Pagano (2004) identify a significant "growth dividend" for countries in the EMU from improved financial market development through deeper financial integration. Similarly, Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007) and Abiad, Leigh, and Mody (2009) illustrate that in Europe the patterns of financial integration and economic growth are different from the rest of the world. 5 More specifically, Masten, Coricelli, and Masten (2008) find evidence that especially countries with a relatively high degree of financial development could benefit. According to their argument, countries have to build up significant capacity to absorb capital inflows. However, financial integration itself is unlikely to be the only source of the European success story (Imbs, 2009) . One explanation is provided by Friedrich, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer (2013) who argue in favor of a complementary relationship between financial integration and political integration in Eastern Europe, which helped financial integration to realize its growth-enhancing potential by changing investors' expectations.
In contrast to the question of growth effects through financial integration, evidence for a causal relationship of financial crises on economic growth is much clearer. Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) and Dell 'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008) provide robust evidence for significant negative growth effects of financial crises. However, both studies do not intend to figure out the channels of these adverse effects. Most closely related to our work is the paper by Eichengreen, Gullapalli, and Panizza (2011), which provides a synthesis of the literature on the growth effects of financial integration and crises. Applying the Rajan-Zingales methodology, they estimate the growth effect of 5 For evidence that the EMU experienced a substantial financial integration process, e. g., see Lane (2006) , Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) , Schmitz and von Hagen (2011), and Kim, Moshirian, and Wu (2006) . Spiegel (2009) tries to disentangle the channels through which banking sector integration strengthened. He finds a "pairwise" effect in the sense that integration deepened especially through banking relationships in which both banks are hosted in the EMU. financial integration while controlling for the depth of the financial system and distinguishing between decades with and without crises. On the one hand, they confirm the tendency of a positive impact of financial integration on growth, but, on the other hand, they find that financial integration did not have any impact in times of crisis. Hence, they conclude that countries could benefit from financial integration during normal times, but that there were no additional benefits or costs during times of crises.
6 However, as the previous literature, Eichengreen, Gullapalli, and Panizza (2011) focus on the long-run growth effects of financial integration by considering average industry production growth over a decade. Such an approach is not well-suited for the analysis of growth effects during times of financial distress when integration can revert quickly. By estimating the model on a yearly basis, we are able to identify the short-run growth effects of financial integration.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets the stage by describing the measurement of banking sector integration and showing the evolution of these measures in Europe.
Section 3 explains the methodology used in our analysis. Section 4 gives an overview of the data. Sections 5 and 6 report the regression results for the presence of foreign banks as well as for cross-border lending. Finally, Section 7 concludes. The developments in European financial markets illustrate the superiority of using de facto measures, since de jure capital controls are no longer present in Europe and did not emerge in the crisis either. Nevertheless, financial markets are now far more segmented than they had been right before the crisis. Hence, we measure banking sector integration by de facto measures. As our focus is on banking sector integration, we are using total assets of foreign banks relative to GDP. [ Figure 1 ]
The mild reduction in domestic bank assets seems to be related to the ECB's liquidity support (especially the LTROs), which was often invested in sovereign bonds and helped to avoid balance sheet reductions (Acharya and Steffen, 2014) . Figure 2 illustrates the development of the share of foreign assets in total bank assets and gives a similar impression as Figure 1a . Since 2000, the share of foreign bank assets doubled until 2007 but started to decrease with the onset of the crisis.
[ Figure 2 ] has the highest foreign share with about 50% of total assets. Sweden is the country with the lowest share of foreign banks (7.6% of total bank assets).
9 The variable Credit inflow will be described in Section 6 analyzing cross-border lending. 10 Note that in the European Union Luxembourg has the biggest banking sector with mean total assets of about 30 times GDP. However, due to an insufficient number of industries we excluded Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta in the following analyses. Croatia is excluded because it does not report data on foreign and domestic bank assets.
Methodology
We apply the approach of Rajan and Zingales (1998) and study differences between industry production growth rates in countries with different degrees of banking sector integration. Industries are characterized by their inherent need for external capital to finance their capital expenditures in addition to using internal financing. If banking sector integration reduces financial constraints for industrial firms, industries that rely heavily on external capital should benefit more in terms of production growth. Studying the effect of banking sector integration on growth on the industry level has two main advantages.
First, reverse causality issues are mitigated, since it is unlikely that production growth of specific industries affects banking sector integration. This problem is further reduced by including the first lag of the integration variable. Second, we can include a full set of twodimensional fixed effects, which allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity. However, this also has a downside: The methodology does not allow for the identification of absolute growth effects because parts of the effect of banking sector integration on economic growth are absorbed by the fixed effects. Hence, causal inference can only be drawn with respect to the differences between the effects on production growth of different industries stemming from the industry-specific dependence on external finance.
Empirical model
Our baseline equation is similar to that by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , using annual data instead of long-run averages and distinguishing between foreign and domestic assets:
i denotes the country, j the industry, and t the year. Following Rajan and Zingales (1998), we include the lagged share of industry production as a fraction of GDP to account for catching-up effects of young industries.
11 The coefficient of interest is δ 1 , which captures the differential growth effect of banking sector integration. We control for the domestic provision of external finance via the interaction term of domestic bank assets (over GDP) and external dependence. Due to the three-dimensional structure of our dataset, we can include a large set of fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Countryindustry fixed effects, α i,j , control for all time-invariant factors varying on the countryindustry level, e. g., constant subsidies for a given industry in a given country. Industrytime fixed effects, β j,t , capture all effects on a specific industry in a specific year across all countries. One example might be a global industry shock like oil price changes. Finally, we include country-time fixed effects, γ i,t , which capture factors that affect all industries in a specific country and year in the same way, e. g., country-specific business cycles with influence on demand for all industries. In all regressions standard errors are clustered on the industry level.
Our study is designed to estimate short-run effects of banking sector integration on industry production growth. We measure banking sector integration as total assets of foreign banks relative to GDP rather than using the fraction of foreign in total bank assets. This allows us to identify the effect of additional foreign capital provided by the banking sector (holding constant domestic bank assets). Most other studies focus on the composition of bank assets by using the share of foreign banks. In contrast, our study focuses on the growth effect of additional external financing by foreign banks, holding domestic financing constant.
Definition of crisis, deleveraging and disintegration
Our analysis distinguishes between crisis times and normal times, times of domestic bank deleveraging and other times, and banking sector disintegration and integration by defining three sets of dummy variables. All dummies are on a country-year basis. Table 2 shows their definitions.
[ Table 2] 11 While Rajan and Zingales (1998) identify a stronger growth of smaller industries independent of financial development, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2008) show that industries composed of small firms can also benefit more from financial development (independent of their need for external finance).
For the dummy variable Crisis, we use the country-specific beginning of the crisis from Laeven and Valencia (2013a) who provide a comprehensive database of banking crises from 1970 to 2011. The beginning is defined by two conditions. First, there have to be indicators of significant distress in the banking sector, such as bank liquidation, bank runs, and significant losses. Second, the government has to provide significant rescue measures (see Laeven and Valencia, 2013a) . Based on this definition, not all countries in our sample suffered from the recent crisis; examples are Estonia, Poland, and Finland.
Since the database only provides information about the beginning of the crisis, we define the end as the first year when real GDP growth is positive and the unemployment rate is decreasing. We add the second condition, since GDP growth rates are typically very sensitive with respect to government spending. In the crisis, growth rates plummeted massively in 2009 but many countries experienced a positive GDP growth rate already in 2010 because of large fiscal stimuli. At the same time, many countries still experienced increasing rates of unemployment and had to provide significant rescue packages to the banking sector. Hence, we do not think that defining the end of the crisis based on GDP growth alone is appropriate. Table 3 gives an overview of the country-specific timing of the crisis.
[ Table 3] The dummy variable Deleveraging measures the extent to which domestic banks shrink their balance sheets. We define it as a binary variable, being 1 if in country i the value of total assets of domestic banks per GDP in year t minus the value in year t − 1 is below a certain threshold and 0 otherwise. The thresholds used are 0, −1 pp, and −3.5 pp.
The second threshold lies between the 20th and 30th percentile, whereas the third is close to the 30th percentile. These definitions still provide us with a sufficient number of observations on both sides of the thresholds (see Table 4 ). Remember that the inclusion of two-dimensional fixed effects already absorbs many degrees of freedom.
As a counterpart of domestic bank deleveraging, we consider disintegration of foreign banks. Disintegration is defined analogously to Deleveraging. Hence, it has the value 1 if in country i the change of foreign bank assets over GDP in year t compared to year t − 1 is smaller than a certain threshold. We again use the threshold 0 as well as values close to the 20th and the 30th percentile, i. e., −1.5 pp and −5 pp (see Table 4 ).
[ Table 4 ]
Data
The analysis is based on industry-level data from EU countries. We drop Malta, Cyprus, and Luxembourg, since they do not provide a sufficient number of different industry observations. They also exhibit features of financial centers, which may distort our results because the values of banking sector integration can be extreme compared to the remaining countries.
12 In addition, Croatia does not provide data for total assets of foreign branches and subsidiaries. Hence, our final sample consists of the remaining 24 EU member countries.
Industry production Annual industry data are obtained from the Eurostat database
Structural Business Statistics, which provides production data on an annual basis up to In order to make results comparable to previous studies, we match the NACE industry classification using official correspondence tables from UNIDO to the 3-and 4-digit industry sectors originally studied in the work of Rajan and Zingales (1998) . This procedure yields 35 industry sectors. Industry production values are deflated by the consumer price index.
13
Macroeconomic variables, such as GDP and inflation rates are also obtained from the Eurostat database. All data are converted in euros based on the corresponding exchange rates for non-eurozone countries.
External dependence The measure of external dependence is defined by Rajan and Zingales (1998) as External dependence = Capital expenditures − Cash-flow from operations Capital expenditures .
It is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2013b) who updated the initial values of Rajan and Zingales (1998) by using firm-level data from the US for the period of 1980-2006. Table 5 displays the industries and corresponding values for external dependence.
[ Table 5 ]
Banking sector integration We measure banking sector integration by de facto indicators, using total assets of branches and subsidiaries of foreign-owned EU-banks over GDP, named Foreign bank assets, as reported by the ECB. Domestic bank assets are defined as the residual of total bank assets minus foreign bank assets. Hence, it also contains foreign non-EU banks. Data for assets of foreign non-EU banks are scarce, hence using them would result in a large loss of observations. Since the share of assets of foreign non-EU banks is typically very small, our definition provides a good measure of banking sector integration in Europe. Table 6 gives the descriptive statistics for our sample. Due to large outliers, industry production growth rates are winsorized at the 0.5%-level; thereby the mean decreases from 0.4% to 0.1%.
[ Table 6 ] Figure 3a illustrates the distribution of real industry production growth rates for each year over all countries in the European Union. The evolution over time is very similar to that of real GDP growth rates shown in Figure 3b . However, mean industry production growth exhibits a much higher volatility than mean GDP growth (note the different scales).
[Figure 3]
The mean over all countries and years of total assets of foreign branches and subsidiaries is 59.0% of GDP, whereas the mean of total assets of domestic banks is 187.9% of GDP.
15
Roughly one fifth of country-year observations fall into a crisis period and one third into a phase of financial disintegration or deleveraging of domestic banks, respectively (see Table   6 ). Appendix Table 15 displays the correlation structure between the dummy variables.
Overall the correlations are relatively small. Interestingly, the correlation between times of crisis and periods of domestic bank deleveraging is close to zero. Figure 4a illustrates that deleveraging and disintegration were also associated to the bursting of the dot-com bubble after 2001 and not just to the recent crisis.
Additional country-specific statistics are found in Table 3 and in Appendix Table 14 .
[ Figure 4 ]
5 Banking sector integration and industrial production growth in Europe
Banking sector integration over the cycle
We start our analysis by documenting the growth effect of foreign bank assets over the entire cycle (2000 until 2012) before distinguishing different subsamples.
We find a positive growth effect of banking sector integration in the European Union over the entire sample. The coefficient of the interaction term between the amount of foreign assets over GDP and industries' external dependence is slightly above 0.1 and is statistically highly significant (see the first regression column in Table 7 ). This is in line with previous studies, which found that foreign bank presence has a positive growth effect (see, e. g., Bruno and Hauswald, 2014; Giannetti and Ongena, 2012) .
The variable Credit inflow will be described in Section 6 analyzing cross-border lending. 16 In general, this growth-enhancing effect of banking sector integration might be induced by better lending conditions for corporations. The analysis of Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga (2001) and Giannetti and Ongena (2009) point in this direction as they argue that foreign bank entry depresses margins and profitability for domestic banks, improves the capital allocation and mitigate frictions in the credit market.
[ Table 7] The industry share enters with a negative and highly significant coefficient. This is in line with previous studies. In contrast, the coefficient of the interaction between total assets of domestically owned banks and external dependence is statistically insignificant.
To gauge the economic significance of the estimated effects, we calculate the differential in real growth rates by Rajan and Zingales (1998) , as is common in the literature (Friedrich, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer, 2013; Guiso, Jappelli, Padula, and Pagano, 2004; Masten, Coricelli, and Masten, 2008) .
Consider first a country with a high amount of foreign bank assets per GDP (75th percentile of the distribution), corresponding to 0.820 (see Table 8 ). We can express the growth effect of integration in a given country as the growth differential between two industries differing in their need for external financing (more specifically, the industries at the 75th and 25th percentile of the distribution of external dependence):
Over the cycle, an industry with a high dependence on external financing grew on average by 2.9 percentage points (pp) per year faster than an industry with a relatively low dependence on external financing in a country with a relatively high degree of banking sector integration. For a country with a relatively low value of foreign bank assets (25th percentile), the difference between industry growth rates is 1.1 pp (growth differential 75%−25% in country 25% = 0.011). Hence, the cross-country difference between the growth differentials is 1.83 pp per year. This magnitude is comparable to previous studies. E. g., Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) find that financial integration could generate additional economic growth in Europe of about 1 pp per year for the period from 1980-1997.
[ Table 8 ]
Banking sector integration during the crisis
Holding everything else constant, we expect that the strength of the relationship between banking sector integration and industry production growth differs during times of crisis and in normal times. In particular, during a crisis banks reduce financing to the real sector, which translates into more severe financial constraints. This makes foreign financing more valuable in a crisis. The extent to which firms became financially constrained during the crisis is described in detail by Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2010) . Using survey methods, they illustrate that many firms considered themselves as financially restricted.
Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) provide evidence that corporate investment decreased significantly after the onset of the crisis. They argue that the first wave of investment reductions can be attributed to more severe financial constraints because of a negative shock to credit supply. In addition, the analyses of Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) and Dell 'Ariccia, Detragiache, and Rajan (2008) suggest that during crises industry production growth depends on the availability of external finance. According to their studies industries depending more strongly on external funding grew less during past crises. This is likely to play a role during the crisis in Europe, too, since corporate lending experienced negative growth rates in many European countries since 2009. It suggests a tightening of financial conditions although it might also be induced by demand effects (see European Central Bank, 2013). We therefore expect a stronger effect of foreign bank assets on production growth during times of crisis. Hypothesis 1. Ceteris paribus, the effect of banking sector integration on industry production growth differentials is stronger during the crisis than in normal times.
The last three columns of Table 7 provide the estimation results for Hypothesis 1: The first regression gives the results for normal times and the second regression for times of crisis. In the third regression we include the interactions of all variables with the crisis variable to obtain the difference between the two subsamples.
In all regressions the coefficient of the interaction term between total assets of foreign branches and subsidiaries and industries' external dependence is positive and statistically significant. However, in times of crises, the coefficient is more than four times larger than during normal times. The results of regression (3) show that the difference between the coefficients of normal times and times of crisis is statistically significant with a value of 0.354. This result is economically important. While during normal times the differential in real growth rates was 1.5 pp per year, it increased during the crisis to 7.1 pp per year.
Particularly the growth effect during times of crisis is remarkably high, suggesting an important role of foreign financing during times of domestic distress.
The coefficient of the interaction between total assets of domestically owned banks and external dependence is again statistically and economically insignificant both in normal times and crisis periods. The observed differences between the effects of foreign and domestic banks might be due to better lending decisions of foreign banks, which may be particularly important in times of crises. As Buch, Koch, and Koetter (2009) show, more successful banks are more likely to do cross-border business. Hence, foreign banks should be on average more successful than domestic banks, which might translate into higher industrial production growth. Due to the impact of regulatory pressure, the reduction of the balance sheets and credit provision are unlikely to be fully or even mainly driven by demand effects. Since there is evidence for real effects of lending shocks 20 , we expect that additional capital provided by 17 Koetter and Wedow (2010) directly investigate whether the quantity of loans or rather the quality of loans matters for economic growth. Using stochastic frontier analysis to measure the quality, they investigate economic growth and loan supply in different German regions and find a significant growth effect of the quality and an insignificant effect of the quantity of loans.
18 See Adrian and Shin (2010) for evidence of a strong procyclicality of bank leverage. Brunnermeier (2008) explains this behavior by reduced market liquidity and increasing margin requirements.
19 For an overview of EU bank deleveraging, see Bologna, Caccavaio, and Miglietta (2014) . 20 See for example Peek and Rosengren (1997) for evidence of real effects of a lending shock stemming from foreign banks rather than domestic banks.
foreign banks should be particularly beneficial in terms of industrial production growth in times of strong domestic bank deleveraging.
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, the effect of banking sector integration on industry production growth differentials is stronger in times of strong deleveraging of domestic banks than at other times.
In Table 9 we report the growth effect of additional foreign bank assets conditional on the deleveraging of domestic banks. The estimation results confirm the relevance of foreign capital in mitigating financial constraints. First, we identify a stronger growth effect of foreign bank assets in phases of domestic deleveraging than at other times under all three thresholds. Second, the stronger the asset reduction of domestic banks the stronger the growth effect. This supports our hypothesis. Intuitively, foreign banks provide an insurance to industrial firms against negative shocks to domestic bank lending. Not surprisingly, the larger the deleveraging shock, the higher the value of foreign bank presence.
In phases of strong deleveraging (more than 1 pp) the growth effect is economically large with a differential of real growth rates of 6.8 pp per year. For an asset reduction of domestic banks of more than 3.5 pp, the differential of real growth rates increases to 8.1 pp per year. Such an asset reduction is plausible in times of financial crises and would have disrupting effects on the country's production sector.
[ Table 9 ]
Banking sector integration in phases of disintegration
Previous studies on the relationship between banking sector integration and economic growth have typically assumed a symmetric growth effect in times of integration and disintegration. However, it is not obvious that firms are affected symmetrically when financial conditions change. There are two competing explanations for potential differences.
On the one hand, banking sector integration may have a stronger impact on industrial production growth in times of financial disintegration. In times of integration, lax financial constraints may hardly affect firms' production decisions. In times of disintegration, however, constraints may become binding such that firms have to adjust their production and investment plans.
21 According to this argument, we expect foreign bank assets to have a stronger growth effect during times of financial disintegration. On the other hand, the effect may be weaker in times of disintegration if growth effects are largely driven by spill-over effects, e. g., of technological knowledge (see Kose, Prasad, Rogoff, and Wei, 2009 ). Since disintegration can only occur where banking sector integration took place before, technological spillover effects in times of integration may not fully disappear if disintegration occurs. According to this explanation, we would expect a larger coefficient of the interaction term of foreign bank assets with external dependence during the integration phase. However, the second explanation is rather related to long-term growth and it seems more likely that growth effects are stronger during phases of disintegration.
Hypothesis 3. Ceteris paribus, the effect of banking sector integration on industry production growth differentials is stronger in times of disintegration than in times of integration.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 show indeed a stronger effect of banking sector integration on industrial growth in the presence of disintegration. The coefficient of the interaction between external dependence and foreign bank assets is significant and positive and implies a differential in real growth rates of about 4.4 pp per year. This effect is in-between the growth effects derived for normal times and times of crisis. These results suggest that phases of financial integration and disintegration are different. The more financially integrated a country becomes the smaller is the effect on industrial production growth.
Column (3)-(6), however, do no longer provide a significant coefficient in times of disintegration and the coefficient even becomes negative. Especially in sudden-stop episodes with a sharp reversal of capital flows, foreign capital appears to reduce industry growth differentials (although not significantly). Overall the results are less clearcut than for the preceding hypotheses.
[ Table 10 ]
6 The role of cross-border lending So far we have measured banking sector integration by foreign bank presence. One may wonder whether similar growth effects can be obtained for cross-border lending. Then foreign bank presence could be easily substituted by credit inflows.
The literature suggests that foreign banks located in the reference country may be better able to deal with financial frictions because the distance between lenders and borrowers matters for bank lending, in particular in lending relationships where soft information is important (such as lending to small-and medium-sized companies). In a seminal paper, The data on cross-border lending are taken from the ECB, which provides information about credit provided to non-financial institutions (households and corporations) to the reference country by banks hosted in the rest of the eurozone; this variable will be called
Credit inflow in the following. Since the ECB does not distinguish between households and corporations, this measure overestimates the credit provision to corporations. Nevertheless, it should give a relatively good indication of the evolution of cross-border corporate lending. For country-specific information on cross-border lending, see Table 1 .
To investigate the role of cross-border banking, we rerun all regressions adding an interaction term between external dependence and credit inflow. Table 11 displays the results from the basic regressions. Over the cycle we find a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction between cross-border lending and external dependence. The differential in real growth rates is 1.37 pp per year and therefore smaller than the growth effect from foreign bank assets (1.70 pp per year). Note that the coefficient of the interaction between external dependence and foreign bank assets remains more or less unchanged relative to the baseline estimation (see Table 7 ).
When distinguishing between times of crisis and normal times, the significant positive growth effect of cross-border lending vanishes in both subsamples. This is surprising since we expected cross-border lending to play a role in mitigating financial constraints at least in times of crisis (see the last three columns in Table 11 ). Instead the coefficient is negative in both subsamples, so there is no stable and economically significant growth effect of cross-border lending. The coefficients of foreign bank assets are again similar to the baseline analysis (see Table 7 ).
[ Table 11 ]
In times of strong deleveraging, however, the coefficients of foreign bank assets are large, but partly statistically insignificant (Table 12) . Only in the regression with deleveraging stronger than 3.5 pp per year the coefficient denoting the effect of cross-border lending is statistically significant, with a differential in real growth rates of 7.2 pp per year. The coefficient for the growth effect of cross-border lending is never statistically significant in Table 13 , which distinguishes between phases of integration and disintegration.
[ Table 12 ]
[ Table 13 ]
The results of this set of regressions show that cross-border lending has a less robust growth effect than the provision of credit via foreign branches and subsidiaries. The coefficients do not provide consistent evidence that in times of more severe financial constraints cross-border lending plays a positive role in buffering negative lending shocks, although the coefficients often go in the expected direction. The growth effects of foreign bank assets, i. e., of banks being present in the loans' destination country, do not change qualitatively by controlling for cross-border lending. Hence, our major results are robust to this modification. Taken together, the results suggest that cross-border lending is unlikely to generate comparable positive growth effects as foreign bank presence.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the real growth effects of banking sector integration in times of financial fragmentation and bank deleveraging in the European Union. Our study is motivated by concerns of European policy makers that the broad fragmentation process in the European financial system since the crisis hampers European growth perspectives.
Before the crisis, financial integration in the European Union deepened rapidly. Since the crisis, however, regulators and national governments started to push banks into a re-nationalization of banking sectors and sharp deleveraging. Rescue packages were only granted if they were combined with restructuring plans often containing discouragements of cross-border business, and higher capital requirements forced banks to reduce their balance sheets and the provision of external financing to corporations.
In our econometric analysis, we use industry production data provided by Eurostat from 2000 to 2012, containing the financial crisis as well as the first wave of the European sovereign debt crisis, and apply the Rajan-Zingales methodology to a sample of 35 industries and 24 countries. Banking sector integration in the European Union is measured by total assets of branches and subsidiaries of foreign EU banks relative to GDP. Exploiting the three-dimensional structure of our dataset, we are able to include a large set of fixed effects to credibly identify the effect of banking sector integration on industrial production growth. The fact that, due to their historical background, member countries of the European Union are relatively heterogeneous with respect to the degree their banking sector consists of foreign banks as well as its size further strengthens the robustness of our analysis.
Our results indicate that the concerns regarding financial fragmentation are justified. We find a stronger growth effect during the crisis than in normal times, as well as in times of domestic bank deleveraging relative to other times. During phases of disintegration, however, we do not find consistently stronger growth effect compared to times of integration.
These results suggest an important role of integrated banking sectors in buffering the economic consequences of the crisis and in exploiting growth potentials in the European Union.
We identify a growth effect of banking sector integration during the crisis that is more than four times bigger than during normal times. In economic terms, the differential of real industry production growth rates is about 7.1 percentage points. Similar effects were prevalent in times of domestic bank deleveraging. However, also before the crisis banking sector integration had a statistically significant growth effect. Although we cannot make any statements about the total effect of banking sector integration, the estimated effects on industrial production growth are certainly economically important.
Our results including credit inflows provide evidence for a different role of cross-border lending as compared to lending in foreign countries via branches and subsidiaries. Lending via foreign affiliates generates significant effects on the differential between industrial production growth rates, while cross-border credit provision does not have a robust growth effect. This is particularly pronounced during times of crisis and domestic bank deleveraging, when credit of foreign affiliates helps to buffer the adverse effects of more severe financial constraints for firms, whereas cross-border lending does not. We therefore conclude that obtaining soft information about borrowers by being geographically near is particularly beneficial in times when external financing is scarce. Furthermore, it demonstrates that simply replacing bank presence in the destination countries by cross-border lending is not possible.
Throughout all of our analyses we do not find a robust positive growth effect of domestic bank assets. The substantial difference to the strong growth effect of foreign bank assets is remarkable and requires further investigation. It is in line with the current debate stressing that the size of the banking sector in general plays a minor role in promoting economic growth and points towards a potential "overbanking" problem, as was diagnosed by the European Systemic Risk Board (2014) for the European banking sector. This strand of the literature argues that the growth-enhancing role of a deeper financial sector holds only for relatively small financial sectors. If it exceeds some threshold (relative to the size of GDP), countries do no longer benefit from a bigger financial sector. 22 The statistically 22 One aspect might be that the size of the banking sector is relatively independent from the credit provision to corporations. As Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2014) illustrate, during the last 40 years the banking sector mainly grew because of increased mortgage lending to households. insignificant coefficients of total assets of domestically owned banks provide evidence in this direction.
Based on our results, we conclude that banking sector integration plays an important role for economic growth in the European Union, particularly in the current phase of fragmentation and deleveraging. Therefore, concerns of European politicians and officials of the ECB about the adverse growth effects of the ongoing disintegration process in the European banking sector seem to be legitimate. Further fragmentation of the European banking sector is likely to make financial constraints even more severe. In particular, in countries whose domestic banks reduce their balance sheets, financial fragmentation has exceptionally strong negative growth effects. However, the ECB seems to be aware of the need for an appropriate management of the deleveraging process. Deleveraging i,t 1 Change in domestic bank assets / GDP from year t − 1 to year t ≤ 0 pp (≤ −1 pp / ≤ −3.5 pp) 0 otherwise
Change in foreign bank assets / GDP from year t − 1 to year t ≤ 0 pp (≤ −1.5 pp / ≤ −5 pp) 0 otherwise Notes: Percentiles for foreign and domestic bank assets and credit inflow are on the country-year-level and for external dependence on the industry level and therefore, are unweighted by the number of industry-country-year observations. 
